Iraq Blog:  August 2007

The following news items are taken from the Blog web site
of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Commandos

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 01, 2007
Wanted:  Brits for MiTTS, Fuzzy Hats Optional

Spc. Chris McCann
2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. Div. (LI) PAO
Multi-National Division – Center

   PATROL BASE LIONS’ DEN, Iraq - Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, there were months of “coalition-building” and arguments that were rapidly eclipsed by the war itself. But having a coalition of allies was critical, and one of the United States’ longest-standing allies is Great Britain.
   There are four British Soldiers serving with troops of the 2nd Battlion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., at Patrol Base Lions’ Den, Iraq, at any given time.
   They aid the “Golden Dragons” of 2-14 with the military transition team mission – called “MiTT”
   Capt. James Morris, a native of Devon, England, serves as a Royal Marine and came to work with 2-14 as part of an officer exchange with U.S. troops.
   Sgt. Paul Watson is a native of Manchester and a member of the Royal Guards, the well-known guards around Buckingham Palace who wear tall bearskin hats and are teased by tourists trying to get them to break their straight face.
   They and two others deployed April 28, training in Kuwait and Iraq, before arriving at Lions’ Den in May to work with 2-14. They work closely with Capt. Dennis Grinde, a native of Grand Forks, N.D., and Sgt. 1st Class Scott Madden of Miamisburg, Ohio, the MiTT commander and noncommissioned officer in charge, respectively.
   “There’s really not much difference between the U.S. and British Armies,” said Morris, who served with the 10th Mountain Division’s 3rd BCT in Afghanistan in 2006. “Of course, our basic vehicle couldn’t stop a frozen haddock thrown at the side – your armored Humvees are much better. But patrol tactics are not much different, you can integrate British and U.S. troops with no problem. What you call “fives and twenty-fives” we call “five-meter-and-twenty-meter searches,” but it’s not difficult to figure out. The tactics remain pretty much the same.”
   Watson agreed.
   “I call it ‘same (stuff), different Army,” said Watson. “Soldiers are Soldiers at the end of the day, wherever you go.”
   “It’s really interesting, “Grinde said. “We’re really all one team. Like Winston Churchill said, fighting a war with an alliance is hard, but it’s impossible without one.”
   The MiTT has been working on training many Iraqi soldiers, most of whom they had to re-train from the ground up because the troops had not internalized much of their previous training.
   On a recent mission, much of the Iraqi company was 35 minutes late to begin the patrol.
   “One of the platoon leaders, Omar, always has his guys there on time and squared away,” said Morris. “The others, not so much.”
   “We’re not trying to get them up to Western standards, we’re grying to get them to Iraqi standards, so that the British and American Soldiers can go home and they can have a functional native Army. We’re not here to change their culture, we’re here to train them. In their culture, it’s very ‘insh’allah’ – God willing – being on time isn’t a big deal.”
   They may not be changing the Iraqi’s culture, but there is a little cultural exchange going on between the coalition Soldiers on Lions’ Den. The British regale the 2-14 Soldiers with tales of their riot training, with full-contact company-on-company riots, with a unit of British regulars against a unit of Nepalese Gurkhas. The fighting is no-holds-barred, with live Molotov cocktails – “petrol bombs” as Morris and Watson call them – and attempted kidnappings.
   The Americans enthusiastically ask about Watson’s time in the Queen’s Guard (“Does the Queen send tea out for you?” “Yes, but we can’t drink it, it would involve moving,” And “What happens if you smile?” “Twenty-eight days in jail, no questions at all.”)
   There is also some good-natured ribbing about the American Revolutionary War.
   “You guys should be good at counter-insurgency now,” one Soldier said, laughing. “I think we kind of beat you with insurgency warfare a few years ago.”
   “That you did,” Morris said, also laughing. “although we had a good run at the beginning. But we’re on to those tricks now.”
   More importantly, the Iraqi troops are improving drastically.
   “In the last four weeks, they’ve started really thinking,” said Watson. “They’re asking for vehicle support, but they’re doing their own techniques and we’re falling back a little bit.”
   “They need confidence,” Morris said. “We’re trying to give them that, and then start weaning them off our support. We’re stepping back and doing overwatch while they do more of the missions now.”
   After the Iraqis train at Lions’ Den, they will go south to Tallil to work with an Australian unit, which helps get them to a higher level of skill, Morris said.
   Until then, the Soldiers of 2-14 and their British attachments continue to teach.
   “If we train them in the morning and late afternoon, they remember more,” Morris said.
   Making class entertaining is also important, said Watson.
   “The level of education and literacy they have means that practical, hands-on training works better,” he explained. “And when we make it a little entertaining, it works much better.”
  


SATURDAY, AUGUST 04, 2007
Harveys Tell "The Rest Of The Story"

Sgt. Chris McCann
2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. Div. (LI) PAO
Multi-National Division – Center

   CAMP STRIKER, Iraq - War has been considered a man’s job, historically. Even in Vietnam, women were nurses, not on the front lines.
   But in an asymmetric theater like Iraq, there are no front lines, so support Soldiers, male and female, may find themselves trading fire with the enemy.
   Staff Sgt. Stephanie Harvey, a native of Clayton, N.Y., is assigned to the 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., but she supports the brigade’s 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, transporting supplies to the battalion’s forward outposts.
   Her husband, Sgt. 1st Class Josh Harvey, serves as the brigade’s personnel office noncommissioned officer in charge – a switch from the stereotypical dual-military marriage in which the wife works in an office while the husband is “out in sector.”
   Stephanie joined the army to be a driver, she said, when she was in college.
   “I wasn’t going to class, and even though I was always athletic, I wasn’t exercising either,” she said. “I knew the Army does physical training every day, and my life lacked discipline. So I decided to enlist.”
   Her hometown of Clayton is only a half-hour drive from Fort Drum, so she had a first assignment there written into her enlistment contract so that she could stay close to her family.
   But Fort Drum is the home of the 10th Mountain Division; the Soldiers specialize in light infantry. The vast majority of troops are combat arms and male. So when she arrived at the 3rd Squadron, 71st Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, she was one of very few women in the unit – and the first one promoted by 3-71 after going to a cavalry promotion board. She was also the first female promoted by a 2-14 board after her transfer to 2nd BCT.
   Being a female attached to a combat arms unit was an adjustment for the traditionally male chain of command. Until this point, most combat-arms NCOs had dealt with only male Soldiers.
   “They didn’t know the exact measurements for women’s wear of ribbons and decorations,” Stephanie said. “So they didn’t ask those – but on the land navigation and common Soldier tasks, and the other subjects, I did better than a lot of the male Soldiers. Being female, you really have to know your stuff.”
   The Army is steeped in tradition; ceremonies, customs and courtesies and even some tactics have been handed down since before the United States even came into being. But some habits aren’t positive, and they die hard.
   “When I began supporting 2-14, the guys knew who I was, because they knew my husband – he worked there,” said Stephanie. “Once they saw that I knew my job and wouldn’t take their guff, they took me more seriously. For example, the ammunition system was all messed up, and I’d been an ammo NCO before, so I set it up to standard.
   “But it was difficult at first; they didn’t see me as an NCO, they saw me as a female. It took a couple of months for me to earn their respect, but now I feel that I’ve helped pave the way for other women to work with the unit. At first, people would find a male Soldier to ask if they had a question – even if the question wasn’t in his lane. Now, I have first sergeants and commanders coming to me with questions.”
   Josh said that the stereotype of women being less capable at typically male jobs is unfortunate.
   “The more mature the infantryman, the easier it is for them to accept women,” he said. “But there’s still a stigma there, and there’s always the ‘big brother’ effect, wanting to help. Most infantry guys haven’t worked with females before, so they’re extra cognizant of what they say and do.”
   Stephanie said that female Soldiers have to be “on top of their game” to earn the respect of males, and that whether that’s justified or not, she does it.
   “My Soldiers respect me,” she said. “They say I’m tougher, but I had to be, especially at first, so they wouldn’t think I was a pushover. I have what I think is the most disciplined squad in the company now, and my Soldiers see me as their NCO, regardless of my gender.”
   Even though she’s a support Soldier, Stephanie earned her Combat Action Badge after less than two months in Iraq. The badge is awarded for engaging or being engaged by enemy forces.
   “We were on a logistics patrol on the Mulla Fayyad highway,” Stephanie recalled. “There was an opening in the reeds. Just as we passed that, we saw a guy in the opening, and he fired a rocket-propelled grenade at us. It hit right next to the truck – not on it, thank God – and it just threw mud into the gun turret. It was loud and kind of scary, but we were all fine.”
   Unlike many troops in the 2nd BCT, the Harveys don’t have to deal with a 15-month separation from their spouse. But being together brings its own concerns.
   “Being together is convenient for us, but we don’t rub it in people’s faces,” Stephanie said. “If I’m stressed, I can always talk to him when I get home. But I can’t say ‘Oh, I want to leave early today to go see my husband,’ because my Soldiers don’t have the opportunity to see their spouses.”
   Josh said he is confident in Stephanie’s skills, but he still worries.
   “I make her call me every time she comes back from a mission,” he said, laughing. “It’s a standing order in this family.”
He also takes good-natured joking for their jobs.
   “People crack jokes once in awhile, but the Army chose my job, and I take a lot of pride in doing it well,” Josh said. “But there’s still the machismo that every guy has, I think, that I feel like I should be out there. Everybody does their piece, though.”
   “I pick on him a little,” Stephanie said. “As far as danger, I wouldn’t mind switching with him – but I like what I do and I wouldn’t want the responsibility of his job, with all the paperwork for the entire brigade.
   “Still, I wouldn’t mind being in an air-conditioned office,” she joked.
   The Harveys are nearing the end of their 15-month deployment to Iraq, and will return to Fort Drum together. Josh plans to leave the Army when his term of enlistment ends, and work as a civilian when they move to Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., the post Stephanie re-enlisted for recently.
  


TUESDAY, AUGUST 07, 2007
Maintaining An Uneasy Equilibrium In A Domain of Mistrust

Lt. Col. John Valledor, Commander, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment

   OWESAT VILLAGE, IRAQ - The world eagerly awaits General David Petraeus’ testimony before Congress this fall that will spell the way ahead for U.S. military involvement in Iraq. At stake is the future of Iraq – balancing delicately on a fulcrum of, among other things, trust.
   No single issue in Iraq can be boiled down to absolute black or white. Often, resolution involves vague shades of gray. Such is the case when it comes to securing the Iraqi populace from years of exhausting insurgent attacks. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division has been tackling this complex issue for nearly a year, and has seen stark shifts in strategy with varying degrees of effectiveness.
   Nothing has proven to be more promising, albeit controversial, than the recent bands of concerned Iraqi citizenry taking up arms against al-Qaeda within Southwest Baghdad’s ungoverned tribal lands. When it comes to bringing stability in Iraq, can coalition and Iraqi security forces, along with the government of Iraq and the Iraqi populace place their trust on disparate groups of reconcilable Sunni nationalist tribesmen?
   For months, we have been aggressively fighting al-Qaeda extremists along Baghdad’s southern belt with relative success. Our counterinsurgency campaign followed a year-long effort by Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team. They truly were the first, in early 2006, to pioneer the now widely-accepted concept of forward-basing.
   Previously, strategy was geared toward commuting to work from forward operating bases, or FOBs in military jargon. Their brutal fight into the Mesopotamian plain resulted in a firmly-rooted hub-and-spoke network of patrol bases midway into the canal laced farmlands of the Euphrates River Valley.
   Our Soldiers pushed the line of coalition bases all the way to the banks of the Euphrates, eliminating it as a safe haven for al-Qaeda-inspired Sunni extremists.
   In the adjacent province of al-Anbar, early rumors evolved into full-on stories of an “awakening” amongst a bold council of Sunni sheikhs bent on collectively defeating al-Qaeda and forcibly removing them from Iraq.
   Over time, experience engaging the populace with patrols on foot led to incremental successes. Our company commanders mastered the art of building trusted source networks, which allowed us to fine tune intelligence-driven targeting that eventually put a dent in the insurgency. But as good as they became, they still could not break through the invisible wall - having first-hand knowledge of how to really know terrorists from civilians.
   Last spring, we began to receive repeated reports of attacks along our western boundary between unseen tribal elements. The attacks were taking place along a narrow network of roads which connect Radwaniyah to a village known as Zaidon, on the outskirts of Abu Ghraib. Whenever we pushed forces into the Zaidon-Radwaniyah corridor, villagers told us of intense fighting between al-Qaeda forces and an equally intimidating force, the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade. Formed in 2003, the 1920s Brigade is a homegrown group of Sunni nationalists that reject the democratically-elected government of Iraq and actively employ violence to remove coalition forces from Iraq.
   This group often joined forces with al-Qaeda in attacks against coalition forces and gained notoriety for high-profile kidnappings of foreign nationals.
   The groups split apart when reports emerged of infighting involving al-Qaeda kidnappings and murders of 1920s Revolutionary Brigade leaders. Given that these Sunni groups were busy fighting each other and not our forces, we decided to monitor their activities rather than interfere - the axiom that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ was adopted in this area.
   It was during this period of infighting that our sister battalion, the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment was approached by representatives of the 1920s Brigade.
   A 1-89 patrol was approached by members seeking assistance in their fight against al-Qaeda. The initial reaction, of course, was wariness.
   In June, however, almost overnight, a breakthrough occurred. Leaders of the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade continued their attempts to talk to coalition forces, including leaders of Task Force 1-89. What followed was a unique partnership, in which local tribesmen, principally from the Zobai tribe, guided a squadron- level attack into al-Qaeda-infested areas and identified known safe houses, buried improvised explosive devices and suicide-car-bomb factories. The men of the 1920s Brigade even surrounded highly sought-after terror leaders.
   The leaders of 1-89 reciprocated, offering small cash rewards for the continued turn over of improvised explosive devises and information leading to the capture of other insurgent cell leaders, a policy applied to any Iraqi offering useful tips.
   Within two weeks, an area known as extremely lethal became fully pacified. Once remnants of al-Qaeda were forcefully removed, the tribesmen established a series of crude roadside checkpoints to prevent their return.
   Task Force 1-89 worked with the bands of concerned citizens to create a simple force-protection marking system to prevent other coalition forces - including attack aircraft - from firing on them.
   More importantly, once the nearby villages were free of al-Qaeda, the ranks of active citizens grew exponentially. Soon the banded residents were not just securing their tribal villages; they gained courage and organic resources, and began to spread their assault against terrorists further to the south and east, deep into the Euphrates River valley.
   Their courage in confronting al-Qaeda, while promising not to attack coalition forces, established a wary trust which has been borne out.
   Our introduction to this group of concerned citizens – by now far beyond just 1920s Revolutionary Brigades - came by way of a meeting between 2-14, 1-89, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment who operate in Fallujah and Abu Ghraib.
   The Marines had been working with the citizens for several months, given their geographic proximity to the al-Anbar province’s “awakening.”
   Iraq’s tribes do not fit neatly within the confines of politically drawn boundaries, and their expanding effort to rid their villages of al-Qaeda to the edge of the Euphrates overlaps the military boundaries with Task Force 1-89 and 2/7 Marines.
   The group’s leader, who I will refer to as Abu Adnan, is a surprisingly unimposing figure. The deeply tanned Sunni in his early 40s is frosted with a mane of grey hair, and maintains a semi-permanent grin. Naturally charismatic, it is easy to see how this figure commands both respect and loyalty. Despite being a leader of an irregular tribal force of concerned local citizens - numbering somewhere in the range of several hundred to a thousand - he chooses to dress like your average Iraqi tribesman. The normality of his appearance is only broken by a circle of shadowy advisors and heavily-armed bodyguards.
   Pragmatic in his views of Iraq’s state of affairs, as well as our ability to provide direct support to him, Adnan rejects labels, declaring himself a simple revolutionary seeking to represent the security needs of his fellow tribesmen residing in and around the village of Zaidon.
   As he warms up, he reveals fragments of his secretive past. Adnan fondly reminisces of the grand old days of Saddam’s Baath party, and hints at a short-lived 13- year career as a senior-level sergeant in the Iraqi Army and service in the Iran-Iraq war. Most impressive is his memory and geographical awareness; he carries an intricate hand-drawn map of his group’s area of operations, complete with roads, canals and pinpointed locations of al-Qaeda safe houses.
   Around him are a handful of armed civilian-attired lieutenants who execute and enforce his orders by a rudimentary network of radios and cell phones. These are the subordinates who maintain daily contact with our Army leaders and a network of concerned-citizen checkpoints.
   Eventually, the small talk tapers off to the meeting’s focus - efforts to hunt down and kill al-Qaeda operatives in the areas we share.
   Adnan quickly describes his plan of attack on his “pirate’s” map. As I follow along on my topographic map, I nod in agreement; the plan is simple, but tactically sound. All he asks in return is support, consistent with our articulated rules of engagement, in chasing down al-Qaeda insurgents that evade the clutches of his fighters.
   We conclude by sharing cell phone numbers between his lieutenants and our interpreter. I leave the strange meeting almost doubting the military capabilities of this Sunni organization – and their well-meaning intentions.
   But the days following are nothing short of earth-shattering. The level of attacks against our Soldiers dropped from an average of 16 a day to one. Our company commander’s human intelligence sources began reporting widespread elimination of known terror leaders. IED attacks, the biggest killer of Soldiers in Iraq, stopped cold. The incessant mortar attacks against our partnered Iraqi Army soldiers also stopped.
   Patrol leaders began seeing armed local tribesmen with their heads wrapped in red and white checkered scarf’s known as Yashmags and colored friend or foe markings peacefully turning over IED munitions and components to them. At first, the thought of Iraqis dressed like terrorists handing over IEDs was unfathomable – but it seems to be working.
   Unspoken was our suspicion that these citizens are so good at finding the elusive IEDs because they plant them; such is the gray world we operate in here.
   In a matter of just two short weeks, the concerned local citizens made a tremendous impact, with more progress against al-Qaeda in our part of Iraq than the highly-touted high-tech weapons and sensors brought to bear by the coalition. Moreover, the actions of these citizens inspire other groups around the 2nd BCT’s operational environment to join their ranks, like pools of mercury rolling into one mass. The former 1920s Revolutionary Brigade promptly joined forces with those of Jaish al-Islami Al-Iraq, the Islamic Army of Iraq, yet another Iraqi nationalist extremist group.
   The possibilities are frightening, but we must capitalize on the opportunity presented by this initiative. We are employing the latest biometrics technologies to enroll these concerned citizens into a common coalition biographical database. Citizens voluntarily have their picture taken, biographical data cataloged, and their retinas and all 10 fingers scanned. Sharing this database of concerned local citizens with the government of Iraq allows for subsequent vetting and enrollment into the Iraqi Police force or Army. Either way, this biometric enrollment system represents our best effort to date at establishing a census of the local military-aged male population.
   Also, our leaders, in partnership with the leaders of the concerned citizen groups, have established a weapons registry database which ties each weapon to a specific person manning checkpoints in and around their villages.
   These efforts, although time-consuming, ensure that the group purges known criminals from their ranks and safeguards against future infiltration by rogue al-Qaeda members. We have enrolled over 3,000 of these concerned local citizens into the biometric database and are working through Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior to enable formal follow-on police training and subsequent posting in the very same neighborhoods they voluntarily safeguard.
   Everyone - even the concerned citizens – knows that as an informal Sunni militia, outside the government’s rule of law, is unacceptable. Our access to the government of Iraq and technology facilitates the progression from an informal nationalist militia group to a formal, legitimate Iraqi security force. Surprisingly, this is a goal of many of the group leaders – to become legitimate soldiers and police officers once again. In fact, many are emerging as former Iraqi Army leaders disbanded in the months following the invasion.
   The other, and larger, challenge is gaining acceptance by Iraqi Army forces we are partnered with. In their eyes, these groups are nothing more than current and former terrorists banded into a homogeneous Sunni militia. Iraqi Army forces in the 2nd BCT’s area are predominantly Shia, and the appearance of a buildup of Sunni militias makes them justifiably nervous. They know - as we do - that some of these citizens have in the past attacked both U.S. and Iraqi security forces. Their actions are outside the rule of law, regardless of their success against al-Qaeda, and the Iraqi soldiers—Junud, are to kill or apprehend members on sight, in accordance with Iraqi Army orders. The fact that we are tacitly supporting these groups leads them to question our allegiance.
   But given the tribal and sectarian violence prevalent in the area and distrust between the formal and informal security forces, our options are limited. We must capitalize on the success of this grassroots local citizens’ phenomenon and their zeal to crush al-Qaeda while simultaneously reassuring our Iraqi Army partners that we will prevent any clashes between these legitimate and informal security forces. We must buy time for the Iraqi government to digest the full impact of this ever-widening “awakening”. Soldiers must track both Iraqi Army and concerned citizens’ actions more closely than ever and forcibly position themselves as a buffer force, if need be, to avert a disaster. Cultivating trust amongst all of these groups with different ways to achieve the same end is more important than ever. Maintaining the uneasy balance of trust between disparate grassroots groups of citizens claiming to guard the populace, both within and without the rule of law is no easy task. Again, the task – in its infinite shades of gray, falls to the U.S. Soldier operating in Iraq.
  


FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 2007
Golden Dragons Provide Healthcare To Residents

2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. Div. (LI) PAO
Multi-National Division – Center

   PATROL BASE DRAGON, Iraq - Local residents of the area around Combined Patrol Base Dragon, Iraq, on the banks of the Euphrates River, came to the base for medical treatment Aug. 7
   Army medics from 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment “Golden Dragons,” 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., joined Iraqi medics from 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army Division to create the impromptu clinic.
   Citizens said that they felt much safer in the area – long held by terrorists – since concerned local citizens have begun working with U.S. and Iraqi forces to quell the violence.
   The medics treated 100 residents from five different tribes for ailments ranging from upset stomachs to colds and coughs and did what they could for serious medical issues.
   “Operations like these are key to developing a good rapport with the Iraqi civilians and tribes,” said Capt. Christopher Dominguez, a native of Grand Junction, Colo., physician’s assistant with 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd BCT.
   “It was great. These operations give us a chance to get all the medics together, and we learn a lot. We also get to see a lot of children, which is nice.”
   Dominguez said the combined medical engagement was one of the most successful in the area so far, because the citizens feel safe enough to leave their homes. The service was badly needed, he said.
   “Most of the people here don’t have medical care,” Dominguez said. “Hospitals in Baghdad and even Mahmudiyah are difficult to get to. We can provide a lot of assistance to them.”
  


MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 2007
Tips Lead Coalition Troops To Cache

2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. Div. (LI) PAO
Multi-National Division - Center

   PATROL BASE WARRIOR KEEP, Iraq - Large amounts of ammunition and bomb-making material were found in a series of caches, alongside a road southeast of Baghdad Aug. 7.
   Soldiers of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., were searching along the road at about 11 p.m. when they found two caches buried in red water tanks one foot below the ground.
   The weapons and gear inside the tanks were wrapped in burlap bags. The caches included 32 120mm mortar rounds, 12 60mm mortar rounds ,13 rocket-propelled grenades, a set of night-vision goggles, six motorcycle batteries, a high-powered wireless antenna, 200 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles, a roll of electrical wire and assorted RPG parts, 50 flares, a roll of detonation cord and a tripod for a mortar tube.
   Shortly afterward, Soldiers detained two local men who lived in the house next to the cache. A source had identified the two as being responsible for burying the weapons.
   At 3 p.m., in a separate incident, concerned local citizens brought a cache to a patrol base. The citizens said they found the cache along the nearby Mulla Fayad highway. It contained 11 82mm mortar rounds, a rocket-propelled grenade and four anti-tank rounds with Cyrillic writing on them.
   The men were taken to a nearby patrol base for questioning. The explosives were destroyed in a controlled detonation by an explosive ordnance disposal team.
  


TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 2007
WAG Bags Make Life On Forward Outposts Easier

Sgt. Chris McCann
2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. Div. (LI) PAO


   CAMP STRIKER, Iraq - It happens.  It hits fans.  Bears do it in the woods.  But where can a Soldier do it when there are no portable toilets?  Enter the WAG bag.  The official name is the "Waste Aggregation and Gelling" bag, and it was developed by three residents of Bozeman, Mont., in 1999.  Bill and Pam Phillips and Mike Groff were motivated by a desire to reduce human impact in wilderness areas, and they developed the bags - and the "Pooh Powder" that fills them - to be functional and easily biodegradable.
   The military began issuing WAG bags to Soldiers in Iraq due to the lack of flush toilets in most of the country.  Soldiers have long built outhouse-style toilets, and movies about the Vietnam War made the burning of waste in 55-gallon drums from underneath them famous.  Outhouses are still built, but with the new bags, there is no need for troops to burn the waste.  Each bag comes in a plastic packet that contains the funnel-shaped WAG bag itself, an opaque plastic bag for disposal, toilet paper, and a hand sanitizing wipe.  Inside the WAG bag is a quantity of Pooh Powder.  When waste comes in contact with it, the powder gels the liquid waste, encapsulates the solid waste, neutralizes odors and begins the decay process.   Pooh Powder is a mix of non-toxic, polymer-based absorbent similar to that in disposable diapers, an organic decay catalyst and the odor neutralizer, custom-engineered for the purpose by Phillips Environmental Products.  
   The resealable disposal bag was included to allow backpackers to carry their waste out with them or put it in a landfill, and it reduces the spread of bacteria through containment of human waste pathogens.  The best part is that Soldiers like the WAG bags - as much as anyone can like something other than a real flush toilet.  "Burning the drums was pretty nasty," said Chief Warrant Officer Jeffrey Moore, a native of Columbus, Ohio, and counter-improvised explosive device targeting officer for 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y.  "We had to pour kerosene into it, and stir it with an aluminum pole from a camo net.  It's much better to use the WAG bags. I'd even like to get some when I go home, for hunting."
   Sgt. 1st Class Jesus Rada, a Los Angeles native and 2nd BCT engineer section noncommissioned officer, recalled his time in Iraq in 2003 when burning the waste was still the preferred method of disposal.  "You had to wear gloves and your chemical protective mask and check the direction of the wind to avoid the smoke and the smell.  It was brutally hot, too - whoever was stirring would have to step back for a while every few minutes.
   WAG bags make it easier and cleaner, and the individual takes care of it himself, so no one else has to."  2nd BCT sends out about 250 boxes of the coveted bags every month, depending on mission needs, said Capt. John Brooks, a native of Mobile, Ala., general supplies officer for 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd BCT.  The 210th BSB moves the bags, along with all other supplies, on logistics patrols to the far-flung battle positions and forward operating bases around the 2nd BCT's area of operations.  Soldiers cite the WAG bag's ease of use, the fact that flies are not attracted to it, and the lack of odor as major points.
   The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd BCT, took over an abandoned Russian thermal power plant on the banks of the Euphrates River in October.  At first they were using barrels as latrines, but they switched to the bags as soon as they became available.
   Spc. Scott Swain, a native of Vacaville, Calif., a supply specialist with the battalion, said he was very happy about the change to WAG bags.  "They're more sanitary and easier - they're just a lot better," Swain said.
   For the foreseeable future, WAG bags will keep Soldiers going. So to speak.
  


FRIDAY, AUGUST 24, 2007
Commando Air Assault Detains Suspected Insurgent
Disguised As Pregnant Woman

   AL-OWESAT, Iraq - Soldiers of 2nd Battalion, 14th infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., detained several men during an air assault mission along the Euphrates River, Aug. 20.
   One of the men detained was dressed as a pregnant woman.
   Crimson Shogun was an operation targeting al-Qaeda-allied terrorist networks in the Owesat and Fetoah areas along the river and brought together more than 100 Soldiers of 2-14 Inf., 50 Iraqi army troops and two local residents who volunteered to help identify terrorists.
   Thirteen men were detained for further questioning, one of whom was on the battalion’s list of persons of interest. His brother was also detained, and was found by the Soldiers of Company A disguised as a pregnant woman in an attempt to avoid capture.
  


FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 2007
Tribesmen For Hire:  Winning The Peace One Sheikh At A Time

By Lt. Col. John Valledor
Commander, 2-14 Inf. Regt.

   Our nation’s focus remains centered on Iraq – what is happening, whether the U.S. military presence should continue or end, whether the coalition is helping or harming the country. But for the most part, they have not spent enough time in Iraq to fully understand the Arab culture and the changes our military is making here.
   The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) out of Fort Drum, N.Y., an infantry battalion organized for counterinsurgency combat, has exploited the opportunities presented by recent provincial reconciliation efforts.
   Principal among them is the opportunity to fully win over the trust and support of the traditional leadership – an intricate and interconnected hierarchy amongst the tribes, each with its own distinct leader or sheikh. The 2-14 task force and company leadership find themselves exercising cultural dexterity in an attempt to deepen their close and evolving relationships with the tribal leaders. Persistent engagement on a very personal level has usurped lethal combat as the most effective means of defeating insurgents by persuading sheikhs to reassert their centuries old traditional influence over southwest Baghdad’s tribal lands. The primary venue for engagement is the now daily sheikh meeting.

The Nuances of the Sheik Meeting
   Sheikh meetings are as diverse as the number of tribes in Iraq but they all share a common core of traditional norms. My introduction to this experience emerged while mediating talks between Brig. Gen. Faisal, our partnered Shia Iraqi Army commander - himself a sheikh of a tribe near Basra - and Sheikh Alwan, representing a local Sunni tribe, the Ghartani.
   The meetings trace their roots to Bedouin traditions, occurring in or near the sheikh’s home. Each home establishes a diwan or large open room, where tribal leaders and their invited guests can gather around in a circle. Similarly, our meeting was set inside the commander’s spacious office within his Iraqi Army compound.
   Participating tribesmen mostly arrange themselves in rank order; the elder members of the tribe position themselves closest to their sheikh, with junior members further down the line along the circle. Following tradition, I, as the guest of honor, was seated nearest Alwan and Faisal.
   The sheikh is easy to spot in the circle. He is usually adorned with distinctive tribal attire; his head is covered with a white ghutra, held in place by a black, knotted and overlapping headband known as the igal. Sheikhs normally wear a light-colored, long sleeved shirt or dishdasha and drape themselves with a traditional cloak called the bisht that is made of a black open-weave mesh fabric, trimmed with gold embroidery.
   These meetings tend to follow a long-established script. Greetings begin with guests shaking the sheikh’s hand, followed by placing the hand over the heart while simultaneously uttering “Salam aleikum” – peace be with you, in Arabic. This, depending on your longstanding relationship with the sheikh, is followed by a series of three or more glancing kisses on the cheeks.
   In this culture it is considered impolite to immediately leap into business discussions. Instead, the initial conversations revolve around catching up on insignificant social talk. Within minutes someone always enters the circle with platter in hand offering tea, or chai. Chai is served in tiny shot-like glasses called istikan. Each cup is filled to the brim with extremely hot chai. At the bottom is a thick layer of sugar that must be stirred with an equally tiny spoon. I made the mistake of grabbing the istikan while simultaneously trying to sip from it - only to recoil in pain, spilling the piping-hot chai all over my hand and suffering first-degree burns from what felt like a glass of hot lava.
   To be successful in these meetings, you must carefully plan out a discussion strategy beforehand, whereby you patiently introduce your agenda to the tribal elders in a series of small sequential discussions. Open-ended questions following pre-arranged talking points seem to work best.
   The midpoint of the sheikh meeting is marked with a traditional Iraqi meal. We stepped out into an adjoining room. Platters of food are brought in, each containing separate courses. Typically the main course is quosi – lamb – with adjoining platters of rice and assorted curries and vegetables. Again, in keeping with Bedouin traditions, western eating utensils are seldom provided; guests, using only their right hand, grab small portions of the meal and consume it. It is considered an honor when the sheikh grabs portions of food for you to consume. Sheikh Alwan, in a scene eerily reminiscent of Fear Factor, reached into the platter of quosi, grabbed a handful of unidentifiable meat and placed it before me. Trying not to appear culturally insensitive, I reluctantly ate it. I quickly learned to keep stuffing my face with food I preferred to avoid a repeat gesture of goodwill.
   One must be observant during the course of the meal. Once the elder finishes eating, he steps away to consume the dessert, usually fruit and baklava. This a silent signal to all that the meal is done. In Bedouin culture, the males do not empty their plates; once they leave the leftovers are given to feed women and children separately. In our case, the remaining food was for the enlisted soldiers, junud, who where patiently waiting outside. They quickly ran into the room to eat the leftovers after we finished.
   The men reassemble in the diwan where once again, according to an unseen script, another round of chai is served and more opportunities to present your agenda open up. You know you’ve reached the end of the meeting when a round of ghahwa Arabia, a potently strong and bitter tasting Arabic coffee, is served. A tiny cup is passed around by a server, starting with the sheikh and working its way down the circle. The rule here is to sip a tiny amount and pass it along; if you don’t want the cup to be refilled for you, it must be raised and shaken as a signal to pass it to the next member of the meeting. Again, I was clueless about this cultural gesture and puzzled as to why the server kept filling my cup with coffee I really disliked sipping.
   In Iraqi culture, smoking is an accepted vice. All sheikh meetings include constant smoking. As a lifelong non-smoker, I found this particular cultural norm the most distressing. I was repeatedly offered cigarettes; these offers continued throughout the discussions. In all cases I politely refused the offer, but that does not stop the rest from smoking and engulfing the room in a dense fog of cigarette smoke. Given that these meetings normally last about three hours, I found myself constantly looking at my watch, gasping for a fresh-air reprieve. Regardless of your personal smoking preference, one must accept smelling like an ashtray at the end of these daily tobacco-rich meetings.
   One quickly learns that the real gains occur in the last five minutes of the sheikh meeting. We simply wrap up the previous three hours’ worth of talking points, shake hands on agreements made, and if necessary, meet separately in a less crowded, face-to-face session with the sheikh to close the deal. In fact, successful meetings are almost guaranteed by simply showing up and enduring hours of Bedouin-esque cultural theater. The sheikhs seem to appreciate our genuine attempt to interact with them on their terms and in their unique cultural setting. Sheikh Alwan’s patience in teaching me Iraq’s rich culture has led to a better understanding of the influence tribal leaders enjoy.
   After nearly a year of building rapport and now fully indoctrinated on to the cultural nuances of sheikh meetings, we adopted a leader led engagement strategy focused on leveraging tribal power to finish off local al-Qaeda insurgent networks and introduce much needed projects for the betterment of the Iraqi populace.

The Awakening
   Local tribal sheikhs mostly sat silent for four years as al-Qaeda ravaged their tribal lands. Those with the courage to resist were either killed outright or coerced into passively supporting them through unrelenting fear tactics and intimidation. It wasn’t until former Iraqi nationalist groups like the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades came on the scene that a course reversal occurred.
   Sheikhs began openly turning against al-Qaeda. Local tribesmen, actively hunting down and killing al-Qaeda members, used the tribes as a resource to mass a much-needed grassroots army. Formations of concerned local citizens began to emerge, led by former Baathist Iraqi Army officers that melted into the population soon after the U.S.-led invasion.
   These former Iraqi Army leaders did not need permission from the sheikhs to enter and kill al-Qaeda members amongst their tribes; they simply co-opted the sheikhs’ influence over the tribes to sustain momentum. Once the tribal lands became free of al-Qaeda networks, the sheikhs re-emerged to regain their traditional position of power - especially when it came to dealing with coalition forces.
   What has emerged is a symbiotic relationship between tribal sheikhs and their appointed concerned local citizens’ operational leaders. Sheikhs don’t really have the muscle to defeat al-Qaeda outright; they rely on their local operational leaders to inspire, organize and if necessary, lead local tribesmen into assaults against the insurgents. The benefit of this relationship is that the increased security arising from the expulsion of al-Qaeda heralds the entry of much-needed and potentially lucrative essential services contracts from coalition forces.

Cautious Relationships
   Given the current landscape, our company commanders find themselves persuading their local sheikhs to maintain the peace. To provide incentive, we simply hire sheikhs, along with their tribesmen, through temporary, 90-day security contracts to safeguard critical infrastructure and keep al-Qaeda out of their tribal lands.
   This strategy is a temporary solution while the Government of Iraq drafts policy and accepts the prospect of many of these tribesmen formally joining the ranks of the Iraqi police or army. If a local sheikh refuses to cooperate, we leverage the power of sending lucrative contracts to neighboring sheikhs. We might pit him against his local operational commanders - the muscle in this campaign – or even explore the option of replacing him with rivals. So far our campaign of engagement has not resulted in this last option.
   Reconciliation presents an opportunity that can’t be ignored. To date, our task force, along with our Iraqi Army partners have benefited from virtually no attacks in the past three months. Lethal coalition and Iraqi security forces-led attacks against al-Qaeda targets of opportunity continue but have truly become less effective. The Iraqi populace in our area of responsibility has outwardly rejected al-Qaeda’s global narrative. Culturally sensitive engagement with the tribal leaders that define the fabric of Iraqi culture has proven to be our most effective strategy for sustaining our current peace dividend. Our young company commanders have adapted to the opportunities presented, and have truly become ambassadors of peace and skillful project managers in southwest Baghdad’s ungoverned tribal lands.
  

Iraq Blog:  August  2007
2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Commandos
Page Copyright © 2008 Kirk S. Ramsey
Last modified: September 14, 2008