Lessons Learned

The following comes from a status report and contains information learned as a result of combat operations.

Lessons Learned

(1)  Establishment of Pattern:

(a)  OBSERVATION:  Units and individuals have tendencies to establish operational patterns when conducting tactical operations from static positions for sustained periods.

(b)  EVALUATION:  On or about 1840 hours, 25 October 1968, a platoon size ambush patrol element of 2-14 Infantry was departing FSB Keene, XT614017.  The point element had cleared the gap in the tactical wire and was in the process of clearing the area forward of the site.  The patrol proper was halted within the gap awaiting instructions to proceed.  This procedure had been employed extensively with the time of departure remaining almost constant, therefore, unknown to the personnel concerned, a pattern had been established.  At above mentioned time, sporadic sniper fire initially prevented movement of the patrol.  The sniper was immediately supported by one 60mm mortar with the gunner placing fire in the vicinity of the gap and then "walking" the (mortar) rounds through the gap and back to the vicinity of the initial burst, causing all rounds to impact within the gap.  Results:  One US KIA; 13 US WIA.

(c)  RECOMMENDATION:  That all Fire Support Bases or night laager positions (static) have sufficient avenues of departure and return;  that time and place of departure vary daily and that command emphasis be placed on the prevention of establishing operational patterns.

 

(2)  Identification of Command Vehicles (Mech):

(a)  OBSERVATION:  Recent activities involving Armor and Infantry (Mech) units have resulted in the destruction of numerous vehicles to include an excessive number of command and control tracks.

(b)  EVALUATION:  Command and Control are easily distinguishable because of the dual or triple antennas affixed to the vehicle.  Sapper or killer teams armed with RPG launcher, supported by riflemen, concentrate their efforts on the command tracks occasionally firing one or two RPG rounds at close range then effecting a hasty withdrawal.

(c)  RECOMMENDATION:  That an antenna similar to the one presently in use be devised for test/evaluation.  Said antenna should be positioned around or under track vehicles to prevent "marking" of the command and control tracks.  However, if the present antenna remains in use dummy antennas should be mounted on each vehicle to confuse enemy gunners and prevent "marking" of the command and control tracks.

 

Leroy Giddings was at FSB Keene that evening, and contributed the following:
"I remember that day several groups of civilians had come up to the wire complaining and asking for medical help.  I remember one group came to the south side and one to the northwest corner.  That should have tipped us off that something was up but no one gave it a thought.  It was not one big patrol but two separate ambush patrols a half  platoon apiece.  After we were stopped by the sniper fire the CP radioed us to get back to the bunkers and we were about half way there when we ran into the mortar rounds.  We should have stayed where we were at.  The other patrol had not left the wire yet and was by the old hootch south of the northwest bunker.  I'm not sure if the rounds started there and worked their way to us or vice versa.  Anyway, we paid a heavy price for the mistake.  One had to feel lucky not to get hit that night."

This copy of Lessons Learned was obtained by and has been generously contributed by Paul North, Echo Co., 2/14th Inf.

Lessons Learned 1968:  Tales Of A War Far Away
Copyright © 2008 Kirk S. Ramsey
Last modified: February 07, 2008