Action in Mogadishu, Somalia 13-Sep-1993

Action of 13 September, 1993

Excerpted from "My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994" by Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, published by Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The next and most violent such mission occurred on 13 September. At the center of events that day was Captain Mark Suich, who led Company B, 2-14 Infantry, as part of the QRF (Quick Reaction Force) the 10th Mountain Division provided to UNOSOM II. Suich had come to Somalia expecting to find combat. Before his deployment, he had seen videotapes from the 1-22 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, that showed evidence of a more dangerous environment than contemporaneous news coverage on television suggested. In addition, Suich had been a member of the 2-14’s advance party before it replaced the 1-22 and saw for himself that the situation in Mogadishu was not benign. The wary captain subsequently told his soldiers in no uncertain terms that they must not hesitate to shoot when confronted with dangerous circumstances. As if to reinforce his point to the soldiers, Company B’s arrival at the beginning of August was greeted by mortar fire during the very first night.

Despite this inauspicious omen, Suich’s company quickly fell into a sequential pattern with its sister companies of the 2-14, rotating every four days between duty as the QRF company, training for military operations on urban terrain, and maintenance. All the while, Suich’s Company B, which was about 20 percent below authorized strength, worked to become familiar with the Somali capital. What it found was that land navigation was extremely difficult, especially due to the inadequacy of available maps that gave only a crude approximation of the layout of blocks and buildings. It also discovered that parts of the city, such as around the Bakara market, were virtually off limits. Mogadishu was awash in weapons. Suich’s interpreter advised that he could purchase an RPG at Bakara for about $10.84

During his first two missions in the city before 13 September, Suich’s intuition told him that hostile elements in the population were increasingly emboldened. Crowds in parts of the city, such as the area north of the K-4 circle, were growing larger and mobilized more quickly. Rock throwing was more common. “I think at this point they were casing us a little bit,” he later surmised. Certainly, the general perception that hostile incidents were on the rise is borne out by the official UN chronology for 31 July to 13 August, during which time 13 separate episodes occurred.

Efforts to keep aggressive Somalis back from US vehicles seldom worked for long. At one time, members of the 1-22 tried fixing bayonets on their rifles to intimidate the bolder Somalis and maintain minimal physical separation. At least during the early days of the mission, the real concern of US soldiers on the streets of Mogadishu was not self-defense against a direct attack; rather, they tried to prevent theft by destitute and determined young men in a society in which any piece of American equipment might have significant value on the open market. Unfortunately, the locals soon concluded that the Americans had no intention of actually wielding their bayonets as weapons and became emboldened once again. Afterward, one Somali interpreter recommended using sticks to ward off swarming locals. This approach better conformed to local customs. Furthermore, because sticks, unlike bayonets, could not inflict lethal wounds, they would be perceived as more likely to be employed.

Nonetheless, on numerous occasions, US personnel found themselves in real danger. Most who left the living compounds with any frequency found themselves subjected to occasional hostile fire. Sergeant Buckley began to think of himself as a target in a carnival shooting gallery. He just kept moving, prohibited by the ROE from firing back at enemies he could not positively identify. “When’s my day?” he repeatedly asked himself.

The experience of driving around Mogadishu proved equally harrowing to members of Company B, 46th FSB, who arrived in August as violence was spiking. Each convoy outside the base seemed to be an adventure, although gradually a sense of routine developed. Captain Marian Vlasak described a 2-mile trip in August between the university and Sword base as “the longest 10-minute drive of my life.” The danger did seem to improve some aspects of soldier performance, though. According to Vlasak, her soldiers took exceptionally good care of their vehicles - nobody wanted to have a breakdown in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the presence of female soldiers, especially officers, continued to surprise the natives. In fact, UNOSOM II personnel did not even have to get out into the streets to appreciate the changing nature of the environment. Late-night mortar fire directed against the university living compound grew not only more frequent but also more accurate.

As part of the UNOSOM II response, on 13 September Companies B and C departed the university compound on a cordon and search mission to find weapons thought to be stored near an identified SNA enclave. The force included a mounted infantry platoon with 40mm Mark 19s and 7.62mm M-60 machine guns. The objective lay 212 kilometers away. The aim was to arrive on the objective by 0507 when the search was to begin. The timing would also put US troops on location before the residents arose for early morning call to prayer. Intelligence did not anticipate aggressive resistance, although a worst-case scenario envisaged an organized defense of the area.

On location, the mounted vehicles provided an outer protective cordon. Company B formed an inner cordon made up exclusively of light infantry around its objective, which consisted of six buildings wrapped within an encircling wall. Company C did the same at a virtually collocated objective, a five-building compound just to the north. The plan required Companies B and C, upon establishing their positions, to notify Somali personnel inside the objectives that they were surrounded and that a search would be conducted. Even before the PSYOP message concluded, members of 2d Platoon noticed Somalis inside the main building removing firearms. Unfortunately, the objective was surrounded by concrete walls topped with shards of glass, thus denying Company B unobstructed access. Moreover, having declared its presence and purpose, Suich’s Company B was not granted immediate admission to the compound. Unwilling to take no for an answer, Suich decided to cut the gate lock. Prior intelligence indicated that SNA militiamen inhabited the compound, an assessment that was corroborated upon entrance when only able-bodied males were present. Inside, Suich’s men seized a modest assortment of weapons and mortar rounds, not to mention a few maps of the university compound that served as home to the QRF. Nearby, Company C uncovered a similar arms stash. The entire process took approximately 2 hours, during which time about 30 to 40 Somalis were detained on the premises.

At some point during the search, Company C received scattered hostile fire from the Benedir Hospital, located about 200 meters to the northeast, and began to return fire. Also in reply, Suich placed M-60 gunners on the roof of the Bravo objective, with the order to return fire if they could confirm a target. Of course, an additional element of complexity in this scenario was that the source of fire was a civilian hospital. The complete willingness of the Somali militias to seek cover behind noncombatants or in a humanitarian facility such as a hospital typified the difficulties of operating in Mogadishu. Gradually it became clear to Suich, as well as his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bill David, that armed, hostile elements were beginning to apply pressure all along the eastern edge of the two company objectives. Burning road obstacles, a sure indicator of brewing trouble, were visible in the distance. Subsequently, brigade intelligence concluded that Aideed’s militias (Aideed was the most powerful of the clan warlords) could mass anywhere in his area within 20 to 40 minutes.

According to the plan, Company C was to exit the area, with its detainees on board trucks, by the same route on which it arrived. One platoon of Company B would accompany it on the return to the university compound. As the QRF elements began their departure, “All hell broke loose.” RPG explosions now added to the din created by small-arms fire. One blast shattered the western gate of Company B’s objective, injuring seven soldiers who were subsequently treated for concussions, including Lieutenant John Reynolds, the company executive officer. Suich concluded that his remaining platoons, as well as the company command group, would be moving directly into an ambush if they were to follow the same route as Company C. Consequently, he decided to blow a hole in the wall along the west side of the of the search objective compound to bound across an adjoining intersection while avoiding prolonged, direct exposure to enemy fire. Suich’s intent was to let his force of three platoons slip away by a more westerly route and, if necessary, request aerial support to enable his force to break contact with the SNA militia. Lieutenant Reynolds was in command of the final 3d Platoon as it departed the objective. Reynolds had noticed several men still on the objective and returned with his platoon to retrieve them. The stranded individuals turned out to be from the battalion and brigade tactical command post. No one in the company, it seemed, was responsible for getting them out.

Amid the confusion, Captain Suich was on the radio trying to discover the nature of the delay. To make matters worse, Reynolds’ platoon was delayed by hostile fire on the way to link up with the rest of the company near the university where the first two platoons occupied an extended position along a small berm running from east to west. From that location they were receiving considerable hostile fire along a 180-degree arc from the south. Out of concern for inadvertently directing fire toward his own men from 3d Platoon as it was on its way to rally with him, Suich kept a tight reign on return fire against the enemy.

General confusion and obstructed visibility within the city brought Suich face to face with the friction of combat. The wait for the rest of his force was not the only problem. Suich later observed, “Really, I was outgunned at this point.” The essence of the dilemma was that Suich’s company would have to move through the gauntlet and then take an exposed left turn that constituted, for practical intents and purposes, a chokepoint between him and the entrance to the university compound.

Reynolds finally rejoined his company but had little time to savor this success. He later described the scene: “It was so bad you could see the bullet holes hit the embassy wall over our heads.” Under pressure, Reynolds had his platoon squad automatic weapon gunner take out a Somali RPG nest and put his force on line, thereby enabling Suich’s lead platoon to engage the enemy freely. During the ensuing action, a soldier in 3d Platoon suffered a serious stomach wound. Luckily, an allied APC happened by. Reynolds dashed over and asked for assistance in evacuating his soldier back into the university. Reynolds placed his injured man inside the vehicle and pointed the way but realized upon closing the vehicle hatch that the driver, instead of following his lead, was moving out smartly in the opposite direction.

Meanwhile, the company medic advised by radio that the soldier’s condition demanded urgent attention. Reynolds then removed his man from the vehicle and sought a shortcut into the safety of the embassy grounds. He successfully conscripted help from an engineer team to blow a hole in the embassy wall to facilitate this maneuver. Once inside the embassy wall, movement to the UNOSOM compound at the university would be relatively easy because the soldiers could bypass the perilous intersection near the entrance.

As usual, however, executing a good idea proved tricky. After some discussion of where to place the blast, the engineers unfortunately chose one of the thickest points in the wall. The explosion produced a hole that was too small to allow the wounded soldier to pass through. By this time, the soldier’s survival depended on the timely arrival of the company reserve’s antitank (AT) platoon that had been detained at the gate by Tunisian guards who had received no authorization to permit its departure. Thoroughly exasperated, the AT platoon leader opened the gate himself and arrived in time to rush the victim to medical assistance.

At the same time, Suich was deeply concerned that if he could not achieve fire superiority, he would not be able to complete his return without taking serious additional losses. Fortunately, Colonel Mike Dallas, Suich and David’s brigade commander, was present at the scene that day and was able to expedite requests for air support. The fact that he was on the ground rather than aloft, however, later became a point of discussion with Major General Montgomery, who had become accustomed to Dallas’ predecessor observing from above.

In this instance, it so happened, Dallas was seeking to obtain the ground commander’s perspective. To be sure, Dallas’ situation was peculiar as the 10th Aviation Brigade functioned as the command and control headquarters for ground and air fire support. Whatever the pros and cons of the situation, having already spent several months in Somalia, Dallas had reached the personal conclusion that “probably the single greatest impact . . . continues to be now both operationally and psychologically” the attack helicopter. He added, “When the Somali warlords started to threaten action and in some cases carried through with threats and moved - or thought they were moving on rival factions or possibly on US forces - the attack helicopters showed up and stopped them dead in their tracks. In many cases, [they] didn’t have to fire a shot; all they had to do was show up.”

Able to communicate directly with gunships overhead, Suich directed the fire by marking enemy positions with smoke rounds. To provide complementary ground reinforcement, Lieutenant Colonel David called out the QRF AT platoon to help cover Company B’s withdrawal into the compound and, in particular, to extract several seriously wounded soldiers.

At about the same time, QRF scout snipers, upon learning from David of the situation just outside the compound, assumed firing positions along the southern wall to reverse the fire equation still further in Suich’s favor. Thus supported, Suich’s platoons bounded their way to the university’s front gate. As Suich later reflected, this near brush with disaster bore striking similarity to the scenario of 3 and 4 October. Above all, he observed, “To this day I still can’t figure out why it [the 13 September firefight] did not serve as a catalyst to get more stuff over here.” The essence of the problem was that on more than one occasion, Suich’s troops on the ground lost fire superiority in addition to facing superior numbers.